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Rebuilding a House of Cards: Envisioning Sustainable 
Federal Housing Policy 
Katherine L. Lewis  
INTRODUCTION 
On February 10, 2009, President Obama held a town hall meeting 
in Fort Myers, Florida, to promote the federal stimulus package.
1
 At 
the town hall, a woman named Henrietta Hughes raised her hand and 
took the microphone.
2
 She told the President that she and her son 
were homeless and living in her car.
3
 The waiting list at the local 
housing authority was two years, so waiting for subsidized, 
affordable housing to become available was not a plausible option.
4
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 1. See Tad DeHaven, Henrietta Hughes, HUD, and the Ft. Myers Housing Authority, 
CATO @ LIBERTY (Feb. 13, 2009, 1:06 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/02/13/ 
henrietta-hughes-hud-and-the-ft-myers-public-housing-authority. See infra notes 194–200 and 
accompanying text, for a discussion of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the 
Stimulus Bill.  
 2. See Linda Bergthold, Whatever Happened to Henrietta Hughes?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 27, 2009, 4:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/linda-bergthold/whatever-happened-
to-henr_b_191303.html; see also Yunji de Nies & Sunlen Miller, Henrietta Hughes, ABC 
NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009, 3:05 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/02/henrietta-
hughe.html.  
 3. See de Nies & Miller, supra note 2. 
 4. Id. Ms. Hughes made an impassioned plea to the President: 
I have an urgent need, unemployment and homelessness, a very small vehicle for my 
family and I to live in . . . . The housing authority has two years‘ waiting lists, and we 
need something more than the vehicle and the parks to go to. We need our own kitchen 
and our own bathroom. Please help. 
Id. 
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The President kissed Henrietta on the cheek and told her, ―We‘re 
going to do everything we can to help you, but there are a lot of 
people like you.‖5 Before continuing the town hall, he told Ms. 
Hughes to stay and that his staff would help her after the event 
ended.
6
 After the event, United States Representative Nick Thompson 
offered Henrietta and her family a house to live in until they were 
back on their feet.
7
 However, most low-income families are not as 
lucky as Henrietta Hughes and struggle, largely unassisted, to find 
and keep safe, affordable housing. 
There is a long history of federal support for helping families 
secure affordable, safe homes. In 1949, Congress first declared its 
goal for a national housing policy: ―a decent home and a suitable 
living environment for every American family.‖8 In reaffirming its 
commitment to this goal in 1968, Congress declared that better 
meeting the housing needs of lower-income Americans was an issue 
of ―grave national concern.‖9 That same year, Congress enacted the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA)
10
 to prohibit discrimination in the 
 
 5. DeHaven, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Bergthold, supra note 2. Representative Thompson was trying to sell a house he 
owned in the area. Id. He and his wife offered to let Henrietta and her son live there, at least 
until he found a buyer. Id.  
 8. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 90-19, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)).  
 9. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (2006)). Section 1701t states: 
 The Congress affirms the national goal, as set forth in section 1441 of title 42, of ―a 
decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.‖  
 The Congress finds that this goal has not been fully realized for many of the 
Nation‘s lower income families; that this is a matter of grave national concern; and 
that there exist in the public and private sectors of the economy the resources and 
capabilities necessary to the full realization of this goal. 
 The Congress declares that in the administration of those housing programs 
authorized by this Act which are designed to assist families with incomes so low that 
they could not otherwise decently house themselves, and of other Government 
programs designed to assist in the provision of housing for such families, the highest 
priority and emphasis should be given to meeting the housing needs of those families 
for which the national goal has not become a reality; and in the carrying out of such 
programs there should be the fullest practicable utilization of the resources and 
capabilities of private enterprise and of individual self-help techniques. 
Id.  
 10. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 
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selling or leasing of housing, furthering the goal of expanded access 
to decent and suitable housing for all American families.
11
 The aims 
of the Fair Housing Act were reinforced by the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA),
12
 which sought to expand access to 
mortgage financing for borrowers in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods.
13
 Despite the potential for improved access to 
mortgage financing for all Americans, President Bill Clinton, 
concerned by falling homeownership rates in the 1990s, urged 
shifting to homeownership as the focal point of national housing 
policy in the United States, and subsequent administrations followed 
suit.
14
  
In many ways pushing for increased homeownership precipitated 
the subprime mortgage boom, and bust, that was at the heart of the 
 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006)). 
 11. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and history of 
the Fair Housing Act).  
 12. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006)). 
 13. See infra notes 93–111 and accompanying text (reviewing the enactment and 
effectiveness of the Community Reinvestment Act).  
 14. In November 1994, President Clinton called on former Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Secretary Henry Cisneros to develop a policy to reverse the trend of 
falling homeownership rates. Peter Coy, Bill Clinton’s Drive to Increase Home Ownership 
Went Way Too Far, BUS. WK. (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/ 
hotproperty/archives/2008/02/clintons_drive.html. Then, in 1995, President Clinton declared 
June 5 National Homeownership Day and in the accompanying proclamation declared:  
For the better part of this century, America has made homeownership a priority of 
national policy. The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing 
Administration‘s home mortgage insurance program, empowering more than 23 
million Americans to buy their own homes. In 1944, the GI Bill of Rights set up the 
Veterans Administration‘s home loan guaranty program, enabling millions of veterans 
to start a new life for themselves and their families. The Housing Act of 1949 declared 
that every American family should enjoy a ―decent home and a suitable living 
environment‖—an ideal that has been reaffirmed in myriad ways since then. 
Proclamation No. 6807, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,957 (June 2, 1995). President George W. Bush 
continued support for homeownership as the focus of U.S. housing and domestic policy, 
announcing his desire to ―give every American a stake in the promise and future of our country 
. . . and build an ownership society. We will widen the ownership of homes and businesses.‖ 
President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), in 41 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 74 (Jan. 24, 2005). It appears, however, that, while the Obama Administration 
supports strengthening the housing finance system in order to stabilize and to promote 
homeownership, unconditional support for homeownership for all Americans is no longer a 
policy priority. See infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text. 
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Great Recession,
15
 but President Clinton did achieve his goal of 
increasing interest in homeownership.
16
 Unfortunately, problems with 
housing finance long have been troublesome for the overall 
economy.
17
 At the same time, however, homeownership is an 
essential wealth-building tool for many households.
18
 Seemingly 
learning from past mistakes, the Obama Administration announced a 
major housing policy shift in February 2011 when the Treasury 
Department and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) announced in a joint report to Congress: ―The government 
must help ensure that all Americans have access to quality housing 
that they can afford. This does not mean our goal is for all Americans 
to be homeowners.‖19 This essential policy shift, however, came too 
late, after the financial damage was done.  
President Clinton‘s support for homeownership was so successful 
that in the early days of the new millennium, housing prices seemed 
like they might rise indefinitely. The dot-com bubble burst, and the 
ensuing recession created an environment ripe for home price 
appreciation.
20
 Interest rates fell to a forty year low, and buyers 
seized the opportunity to buy in the growing market sooner rather 
than later.
21
  
Even when interest rates eventually rose, buyers still flocked to 
the real estate market.
22
 Lenders were more than willing to finance—
and refinance—mortgages, regularly relaxing underwriting standards 
to speed the mortgage lending process along.
23
 Borrowers, however, 
 
 15. In a February 2011 joint report issued by the Department of the Treasury and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the government referred to the financial crisis 
as ―The Great Recession.‖ THE DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY & THE U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., REFORMING AMERICA‘S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 
(2011) [hereinafter TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT]. 
 16. See infra Part I.E (discussing precipitating factors to the dramatic increase in 
homeownership). 
 17. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S 
HOUSING 2009, at 9 (2009) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING 2009].  
 18. See Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the 
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 31 (2006).  
 19. TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.  
 20. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 1. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Lenders relaxed traditional underwriting standards like down payment amounts and 
required debt-to-income ratios. Id. Lenders also failed to verify borrowers‘ incomes, and they 
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often did not understand the terms and features of their loans, but 
they would accept the financing anyway.
24
 In the lending flurry, 
however, even less-creditworthy borrowers easily found financing in 
the subprime market, and, consequently, homeownership in the 
United States surged to its highest rate ever—nearly 70 percent.25 
At the same time, many of the largest investment banks and 
financial institutions on Wall Street made a fortune trading bonds 
backed by pools of securitized mortgages.
26
 Everything seemed to be 
moving along smoothly, but the housing bubble proved that such 
continued growth was not sustainable. Large numbers of mortgages 
entered default, an overwhelming number of which loans were 
subprime, and national housing prices began to fall consistently for 
the first time since the 1930s.
27
 Problems that first emerged in the 
housing finance markets transferred over to the broader financial 
markets and ―forced financial institutions to take massive write-
downs on their mortgage portfolios, igniting a broader banking 
crisis.‖28 Consumer borrowing in all sectors dropped for the first time 
ever, and the economy began what seemed, at the time, like a never-
ending tailspin.
29
 Americans, burdened by excessive housing costs 
 
used loan products with artificially low initial payments that later drastically increased and 
other non-traditional offerings to knowingly sell homes borrowers could not afford. See id.; see 
also ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (2d ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ 2d]; John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the 
Special Seminar on International Banking and Finance 3-4 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2009/pub-speech-2009-143.pdf (―Yet it‘s 
striking that, despite all of the hard and very fine work that is being done around the world on 
these very difficult regulatory issues, relatively little attention has been paid to the initial 
problem that sparked the crisis: the exceptionally weak, and ultimately disastrous, mortgage 
underwriting practices accepted by lenders and investors—primarily but not exclusively in the 
United States.‖).  
 24. See SCHWARTZ 2d, supra note 23, at 74–75. 
 25. At the height of the market, homeownership in the United States surged to near 70 
percent. David Wessel, Rethinking Part of the American Dream, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703513604575310383542102668.html; see 
also infra notes 26, 27, and 59–65 and accompanying text (discussing the rise in 
homeownership and subprime lending). 
 26. For an explanation of the development and the popularity of mortgage-backed 
securities, see infra Part I.E. 
 27. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 1–2; TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, 
supra note 15, at 4–5. 
 28. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 2. 
 29. Id. 
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and staggering amounts of other consumer debt, found themselves 
standing at the precipice of a deep recession with massive job losses 
ahead.
30
 
Further complicating matters, the problems of racial- and income-
based discrimination that plague many areas of American society are 
particularly apparent and troublesome in the world of housing 
finance. While the United States government proclaimed that it 
would ensure affordable housing for all Americans after the Great 
Depression,
31
 historically, it has not always fulfilled that promise. In 
1968, the government did make a symbolic commitment beyond 
ensuring safe and secure housing for all. The government committed 
to preventing race-based discrimination in mortgage lending by 
passing the Fair Housing Act,
32
 a commitment strengthened almost a 
decade later with the passing of the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977.
33
 
Over the decades since the enactment of the CRA, it became more 
common for lenders to extend mortgage financing to borrowers in 
both minority and low-income communities, though it should be 
noted that the roots of the subprime market expansion lie in 
deregulation of large financial institutions rather than in the increased 
lending encouraged by the CRA.
34
 Instead of implementing and 
enforcing the goals of the CRA, the government seemed satisfied to 
make the broad policy statement condoning practices, like 
redlining,
35
 that led to discrimination without also making a 
 
 30. Id. at 2–3. 
 31. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 32. See also infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 98–113 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Parts I.C, I.D, and I.E (examining the goal of increased access to credit 
encouraged by the CRA and the evolution of lending to low-income and minority families and 
of federal regulation of housing finance after enactment of the CRA). 
 35. Lenders used a practice described as ―redlining‖ to deny mortgage financing to, 
typically, minority borrowers. Ren S. Essene & William C. Apgar, The 30th Anniversary of the 
CRA: Restructuring the CRA to Address the Mortgage Finance Revolution, in FED. RES. BANK 
OF S.F., REVISITING THE CRA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF THE COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT 12, 14 (2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/community/ 
cra/revisiting_cra.pdf. Mortgage lenders refused to finance even qualified applicants based 
solely on the racial or financial demographics of the neighborhood in which they wanted to 
purchase a home. Id. Areas deemed undesirable for lending and other services would be marked 
with a red line that showed where lenders refused to invest. See infra notes 87–92 and 
accompanying text.  
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concurrent commitment to take affirmative action to enforce CRA 
provisions and to provide enforcement mechanisms that could protect 
the groups harmed by reluctant lenders.  
Growing quickly after the wave of financial deregulation, the 
subprime mortgage market became the most common place for low-
income and minority borrowers to secure mortgage financing.
36
 But 
the subprime market was also an excellent place for lenders to 
practice reverse redlining, or, essentially, predatory lending.
37
 In the 
end, the CRA‘s goal of ending predatory and discriminatory lending 
policies was brushed aside by mortgage brokers and investment 
bankers who made more and more money dealing in bonds backed by 
unsound mortgages.
38
 These large financial actors only saw the 
potential for profits rather than taking into account the wisdom of 
their actions. 
The end result was devastating both to the financial markets and 
to the millions of Americans facing foreclosure and, potentially, 
homelessness.
39
 Many were quick to blame the CRA for causing the 
foreclosure crisis, but, in reality, CRA loans accounted for only a 
small portion of the troubled subprime mortgages.
40
 The true problem 
with the CRA was that it lacked sufficient enforcement mechanisms, 
and the government failed to enforce provisions or to fully implement 
tools in the Act intended to repair the broken finance system.
41
 
Similarly, in an attempt to ease the burden on tenants, typically low-
income tenants, caused by the foreclosure crisis and a newly broken 
 
 36. Id. at 18–19. 
 37. Vern McKinley, Community Reinvestment Act: Ensuring Credit Adequacy or 
Enforcing Credit Allocation, 4 REG. 25, 26 (1994).  
 38. See generally SCHWARTZ 2d, supra note 23, at 69–75 (detailing the rise of the modern 
mortgage-backed security market and its faulty premises and execution).  
 39. Although outside the scope of this Note, for an excellent analysis of how the 
foreclosure crisis impacted the problem of homelessness in the United States, see generally 
SHERRI DOWNING ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS 
OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/advocacy/ 
ForeclosuretoHomelessness0609.pdf.  
 40. See, e.g., HungryCoyote, Comment to Republicans Blaming Minorities/CRA for 
Financial Crisis, DAILY KOS (Oct. 3, 2008, 2:05 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/ 
10/3/2846/77498 (citing several instances of critics blaming the CRA for the foreclosure crisis); 
see also Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 12 (noting that analysis of data related to CRA 
lending clearly shows that the CRA did not cause the subprime mortgage collapse). 
 41. See infra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
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financial system, Congress passed the Protecting Tenants in 
Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PTFA),
42
 but PTFA, like the CRA, lacks 
sufficient enforcement mechanisms to provide real help to low-
income families.
43
  
Gaining access to affordable housing
44
 in the United States is 
incredibly difficult. Further complicating matters, American families 
were already overburdened by housing costs and continued to be in 
the wake of the foreclosure crisis.
45
 Even before the crisis, the 
affordable rental housing stock was shrinking, as aging caused 
attrition of some of the oldest, and most affordable, units even before 
the foreclosure crisis.
46
 As a result of the crisis, many former 
homeowners flooded into the rental markets, and they often rented 
the few available, affordable units.
47
  
 
 42. Pub. L. No. 111–22, 123 Stat. 1660 (2009). 
 43. See Sasha Abramsky, Innocent Victims of the Subprime Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
6, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/06/housing-
us-subprime-renting-tenants.  
 44. While there are different standards for assessing housing affordability in the United 
States, the most common standard requires that a household spend no more than 30 percent of 
its income on housing costs. ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
INTRODUCTION 23 (1st ed. 2006). A household that spends between 30 and 50 percent of its 
pre-tax monthly income on housing costs is categorized as having an excessive housing cost 
burden. Id. Households that spend 50 percent or more of their monthly incomes on housing are 
considered to have a severe housing cost burdens. Id. For purposes of this Note, the term 
―affordable housing‖ refers to housing that is considered affordable under this common 
standard. 
 45. The number of severely burdened households remained relatively stable between 1980 
and 2000, but by 2008 the number of severely burdened households jumped by a third to 16 
percent of households. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION‘S HOUSING 2010, at 27 (2010) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING 2010]. A stunning ―18.6 
million households faced these high cost burdens . . . [in 2008], an increase of 640,000 since 
2007 and 4.7 million since 2001.‖ Id. Renter households accounted for the largest percentage of 
severely burdened households, with almost one-quarter of renter households affected, while 
only about one-eighth of owner households are severely burdened. Id. During the same period 
nearly half of all renters and one-third of all owners dealt with moderate housing cost burdens. 
Id.  
 46. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION‘S 
HOUSING 2008, at 25 (2008) [hereinafter STATE OF HOUSING 2008]. Between 1995 and 2005, 
about 14 percent of the affordable rental stock built before 1940 was permanently removed. Id. 
During the same time period, 10 percent of the units built between 1940 and 1970 were 
permanently removed from the available affordable rental stock. Id. 
 47. See STATE OF HOUSING 2008, supra note 46, at 5; see also STATE OF HOUSING 2010, 
supra note 45, at 31. 
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The end result is that there simply is not enough affordable 
housing for those with the lowest household incomes, as ―about 9 
million [of the] lowest-income households must compete for just 3 
million affordable and available rental units.‖48 When long waiting 
lists for federally-subsidized, affordable rental housing are combined 
with the affordable housing shortage problems,
49
 low-income tenants 
find themselves in particularly difficult positions when their landlords 
lose properties to foreclosure.
50
 Although PTFA was enacted to begin 
to remedy the situation, its lack of enforcement mechanisms makes 
the Act as toothless as the CRA.
51
 
In order to truly build a sustainable national economy, Congress 
must do more than make a broad policy statement about the future of 
housing policy, and it must move past the days of stating a lofty ideal 
without supporting that ideal with adequate mechanisms for 
enforcement. Parts I.A through I.E of this Note survey the policies 
that precipitated the housing market collapse and the economic crisis. 
Part I.F examines the effects of the economic crisis and the United 
States government‘s response. Part II discusses the essential role that 
housing plays in the national economy and analyzes the repetitive 
nature of federal housing policy failures. Part III proposes a better 
housing policy standard for the United States as it recovers from the 
economic and foreclosure crises. 
 
 48. STATE OF HOUSING 2010, supra note 45, at 31. 
 49. See Federal Housing Assistance Program, NAT‘L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/federal.html (last visited July 5, 2011). Long 
waiting lists to receive a Section 8 voucher from local housing authorities are typical, yet 
gaining access to the Section 8 programs is essential for low-income families seeking to reduce 
their housing burdens, as the program aims to supplement the deteriorating and shrinking 
affordable housing stock. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the 
Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV‘T L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2010) (discussing the difficulties 
tenants face as their landlords fall prey to the foreclosure crisis). 
 51. See infra Part II for further discussion of PTFA and its shortcomings. 
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I. HISTORY 
A. The Rise of Homeownership in the United States 
America began as a nation of renters. Before the Great 
Depression, homeownership in the United States was a possibility for 
only the most affluent Americans.
52
 Financing was difficult to find.
53
 
Where individuals could secure loans, their mortgages rarely covered 
more than 60 percent of a property‘s value and rarely lasted for a 
term longer than eleven years.
54
 The declining economic climate 
during the Depression saw millions of Americans lose their jobs, and, 
consequently, many homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure.
55
 
Those lucky enough to avoid foreclosure often had to sell their 
homes, as banks began demanding immediate payment in full.
56
  
In a striking parallel to the current economic crisis, the 
government was forced to overhaul the entire housing finance system 
in order to stabilize the economy, deal with the foreclosure problems, 
and save the failing housing industry.
57
 Sweeping reforms to the 
entire financial system, like ―deposit insurance, limits on the risks 
banks [could] take, better transparency and investor protections in 
securities markets, [and] a stronger Federal Reserve,‖ paved the way 
for decades of ―unprecedented prosperity‖ in America.58 The 
Depression-era federal initiatives also slowly began to increase 
accessibility to mortgage financing for more Americans.
59
  
With increased access to mortgage finance, America transformed 
from a nation of renters to a nation of homeowners.
60
 In the 1940s, 
 
 52. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 47. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. The terms of such mortgages acted as a barrier to all but the most affluent 
individuals. See id.  
 55. See id. at 47–48 (―By the spring of 1933, more than half of all home mortgages were 
in default and more than 1,000 mortgages were foreclosed every day.‖). 
 56. Id. at 48. 
 57. See id. 
 58. TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.  
 59. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 48. For a thorough discussion of the early development 
of housing finance reform, see id. at 48–52. 
 60. Angelo R. Mozilo, Chairman, President, and Chief Exec. Officer, Countrywide Fin. 
Corp., and Chairman, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Remarks at the John T. Dunlop Lecture: 
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the homeownership rate in the United States hovered around 40 
percent.
61
 Around the same time, Congress created public rental 
housing to serve the ―submerged middle class‖ who could not afford 
the expenses of the private housing market.
62
 After World War II, 
however, middle-class interest in owning, rather than renting, a home 
rose.
63
 By the 1960s, the homeownership rate reached 60 percent and 
rose slowly, but steadily, until it approached 65 percent in the mid-
1990s.
64
 Homeownership rates peaked just below 70 percent in 2004 
at the height of the housing market boom.
65
 
B. Evolution of Federally Subsidized Rental Housing 
Subsidized public housing is available to families that qualify as 
either low- or very low-income.
66
 After World War II, as middle-
 
The American Dream of Homeownership: From Cliché to Mission (Feb. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/M03-1_mozilo.pdf.  
 61. See Wessel, supra note 25.  
 62. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 105. 
 63. See id. at 13–14; HOUS. & HOUSEHOLD ECON. STATISTICS DIV., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES 1 (2004), http://www.census.gov/hhes/ 
www/housing/census/historic/owner.html [hereinafter HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING]. 
 64. Wessel, supra note 25. 
 65. Id. 
 66. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 105. Low-income families are those that earn less than 
80 percent of an area‘s median family income, while very low-income families are those whose 
incomes are less than 50 percent of the area‘s median family income. OFFICE OF POL‘Y DEV. & 
RES., U.S. DEP‘T. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY 2010 HUD INCOME LIMITS BRIEFING 
MATERIAL 1–2 (2010), http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/il/i110/IncomeLimitsBriefing 
Material_FY10.pdf. 
 HUD subsidies are available to any household earning less than 80 percent of the area 
median income. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, THE URBAN INST., 
FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR ADDRESSING LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS 4 (Dec. 2008), available 
at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/411798_low-income_housing.pdf. However, 75 percent 
of all vouchers must be allocated to very low-income households, or those earning less than 30 
percent of the area median income. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 151; TURNER & 
KINGSLEY, supra, at 3. It is those families that qualify as very low-income that are in the most 
need of social services and housing subsidies because they face the greatest risk of 
homelessness. TURNER & KINGSLEY, supra, at 3. 
 Although outside the scope of this Note, for an overview of the homelessness problem in 
America, see generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 38–40. For an argument that the 
government needs to act quickly on issues of homelessness due to current economic conditions, 
see Barbara Sard, Number of Homeless Families Climbing Due to Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL‘Y PRIORITIES, 1 (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2228 
(arguing for expeditious government action on homelessness due to current economic 
conditions). 
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class interest in homeownership rose,
67
 public housing became 
increasingly popular among very low-income families.
68
 
Approximately 2.3 million Americans, including 400,000 low-
income families, rely on subsidized public housing;
69
 however, 
traditional public housing is no longer the dominant form of federal 
subsidies for low- and very low-income families.
70
 Instead, tenant-
based subsidies, predominantly Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers 
(―Section 8‖), replaced traditional public housing as the main federal 
subsidy program.
71
 
Tenant-based subsidies, like the Section 8 program, first emerged 
on an experimental basis. With the Experimental Home Allowance 
Program (EHAP),
72
 a provision of the Housing and Urban 
 
 67. In 1940, the homeownership rate nationwide was 43.6 percent. HISTORICAL CENSUS 
OF HOUSING, supra note 63. That number skyrocketed to 61.9 percent by 1960. Id.  
 68. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 105 (―[T]he median income of public housing residents 
fell from 57% of the national median in 1950 to 41% in 1960, 29% in 1970, and less than 20% 
by the mid-1990s.‖). Congress has attempted to broaden the range of incomes of families 
residing in public housing in order to create more integrated public housing facilities. For a 
discussion of federal programs designed to promote income diversity in public housing, see id. 
at 105–06. 
 69. Barbara Sard & Will Fischer, Preserving Safe, High Quality Public Housing Should 
Be a Priority of Federal Housing Policy, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 1 (Oct. 8, 
2008), http://www.cbpp.org/9-18-08hous.pdf. Additionally, ―[n]early two-thirds of all public 
housing households include an elderly person or an individual with a disability.‖ Id. These 
households often rely on their public housing units to accommodate their needs. Id. at 2.  
 70. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 6.  
 71. Id. at 8 (―Subsidies designed to help low-income households rent existing housing in 
the private market . . . in less than a decade became the dominant form of low-income housing 
assistance.‖).  
 72. Experimental Home Allowance Program, Housing and Urban Development Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1770, 1786 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3 
(2006)). In pertinent part, EHAP required:  
(a) Purpose of payments  
The Secretary is authorized to undertake on an experimental basis programs to 
demonstrate the feasibility of providing housing allowance payments to assist families 
in meeting rental or homeownership expenses.  
. . . .  
(c) Report to Congress  
The Secretary shall report to the Congress on his findings pursuant to this section not 
later than eighteen months after August 22, 1974.  
Id. 
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Development Act of 1970,
73
 Congress charged HUD with testing a 
program to allow families to choose their own rental homes in the 
private market.
74
 Ideally, families would enter the private rental 
market while receiving a federal housing subsidy to help ensure that 
monthly rental payments remained as affordable as those in 
traditional public housing.
75
 HUD accepted the challenge. The 
resulting program was so successful that by 1974 ―Congress was 
convinced that tenant-based housing assistance was a viable 
alternative to public housing,‖76 and it made the program 
permanent.
77
  
The Section 8 program is vital to helping low-income Americans 
bridge the affordable housing gap.
78
 Nearly two million households 
rely on Section 8 vouchers to subsidize their rent.
79
 Despite the large 
number of families that either receive vouchers or live in subsidized 
public housing, only one in four families that are eligible for some 
form of direct subsidy actually receive one, leaving 12.4 million 
needy households to struggle unassisted.
80
 The reality for more than 
 
 73. 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (2006).  
 74. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 91ST CONG., EMERGENCY HOME 
FINANCE ACT OF 1970 AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1970, at iii (Comm. 
Print 1970). Congress passed the legislation with the goal of developing a new national urban 
growth policy and creating the tools necessary to achieve policy objectives. Id.  
 75. 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-3(a). 
 76. U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SECTION 8 TENANT-BASED HOUSING 
ASSISTANCE: A LOOK BACK AFTER 30 YEARS 1, 4 (2000), available at http://www.huduser. 
org/publications/pdf/look.pdf. 
 77. Id. at 4–5. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 permanently 
added Section 8 to the Housing Act of 1937. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5321 (2006); Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 653 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)); U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 76, at 4–5. The 
program created the first permanent tenant-based subsidy for privately owned rental housing. 
U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 76, at 5. 
 Section 8 of the Housing Act, as originally written, provided for two types of subsidies: 
―Section 8 Existing,‖ tenant-based housing subsidies, and ―Section 8 New,‖ subsidies used for 
new construction or substantial rehabilitation of existing units. Id. ―Section 8 New‖ was 
discontinued in 1983. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 133. 
 78. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (examining the affordable housing gap).  
 79. TURNER & KINGSLEY, supra note 66, at 4. Additionally, about 1.05 million 
households live in public housing. Id. 1.29 million live in private units with project-based 
vouchers. Id.  
 80. Id. at 5. 
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90 percent of very low-income tenants is that they ―either receive 
housing assistance or suffer from housing problems.‖81 
C. Push for Low-Income Homeownership Despite Rental Housing 
Assistance Evolution 
Even as homeownership rates rose in the decades after World War 
II,
82
 minority borrowers faced significant barriers to purchasing a 
home. Before the Fair Housing Act of 1968 passed, the Federal 
Housing Authority actively discriminated against minorities by 
―explicitly discourag[ing] lenders from offering government-insured 
mortgages for properties in minority neighborhoods.‖83 Once passed, 
however, the Fair Housing Act prohibited racial discrimination in the 
sale or rental of housing.
84
 Unfortunately, the Act lacked the 
necessary enforcement mechanisms to cause a significant reduction 
in discriminatory mortgage lending practices.
85
 Without such 
enforcement mechanisms, the Fair Housing Act failed to be anything 
more than symbolic disapproval of race-based discrimination in the 
housing finance industry.
86
  
By the 1970s, redlining was a serious and disturbingly common 
problem in mortgage lending.
87
 Inner-city, urban decline in low-
income and minority communities led to neighborhood instability, 
while suburbs, on the other hand, thrived.
88
 Residents in urban 
neighborhoods struggled to become homeowners, mainly due to a 
 
 81. Id. at 3.  
 82. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 83. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 239. 
 84. Id. For a thorough overview of the Fair Housing Act‘s history and potential for 
improving racial and economic justice in American communities moving forward, see NAT‘L 
COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 
(2008), available at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/fair_housing/documents/files/ 
0005.pdf. 
 85. Id. at 240. Passing the Fair Housing Act was difficult, and in order to do so several 
concessions were made. The concessions stripped the Act of its enforcement mechanisms. Id. 
Consequently, the Act became merely a symbolic representation of the government‘s 
commitment to fair housing goals. Id. 
 86. See infra notes 226–31 (analyzing the shortfalls of the Fair Housing Act).  
 87. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 87 (2004); see also supra 
note 35 (describing the practice of redlining certain neighborhoods). 
 88. See Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 14. 
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lack of access to conventional mortgage products due to redlining.
89
 
Although redlining was not a new problem,
90
 anger over its use was a 
central focus of housing policy debates during the 1960s and 1970s.
91
 
Just as the federal government promoted discrimination in the days 
before the Fair Housing Act, federal agencies also played a role in 
promulgating redlining behaviors, primarily by rating minority 
neighborhoods as risky or otherwise undesirable for lending.
92
 
To prevent redlining and to begin to remedy neighborhood blight, 
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.
93
 
Spurred by continuing problems with race- and income-based lending 
discrimination and with the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the 
Fair Housing Act, the CRA aimed to ensure that local lending 
institutions met their communities‘ mortgage lending needs.94 The 
CRA, as passed, was premised on the notion that local lenders have a 
―continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs 
of the local communities in which they are chartered.‖95 Lenders 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Redlining occurred well before the Great Depression. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 87, at 
87. According to a 1917 article published in the Cleveland Advocate, an African-American 
newspaper, lenders refused financing to a group of African-Americans attempting to build 
affordable housing for other minority families. Id. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, mortgage 
lenders continued to practice systematic racial discrimination. Id. at 87–88.  
 91. Id. at 87. Fair housing advocates pointed to the hypocrisy of depository institutions 
willingly accepting deposits from inner-city residents while remaining unwilling to lend that 
money back to help strengthen the local communities. Id. Very few loans were granted for the 
purchase of properties in minority neighborhoods, and it was nearly impossible for a minority 
family to receive mortgage funding for a property in a white neighborhood. Id. at 88. 
 Additionally, predatory lending practices, a common term in recent subprime mortgage 
lending, were also major roadblocks for low-income and minority borrowers in the early days 
of mortgage finance. See discussion infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text (describing 
predatory lending practices associated with subprime lending). Where lenders were willing to 
lend to African-American families, the mortgages often were substantially more expensive than 
comparable mortgages to white families. See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 87, at 88, 91–92. 
 92. For a thorough discussion of the role of Depression-era federal housing overhaul in 
promoting redlining behaviors, see generally id. at 92–96.  
 93. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006); 
see Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 12. 
 94. McKinley, supra note 37, at 25. 
 95. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (a)(3). Proposed during the Carter Administration, the CRA 
originally had two sections. McKinley, supra note 37, at 25. The first section was substantive 
and addressed community lending goals, while the second section was mainly procedural with 
specific guidelines for lender compliance. See id. at 25–26. The procedural section was 
removed from the final bill in order to secure passage; instead, the CRA delegated the authority 
to regulatory agencies to periodically review lending institutions‘ records of addressing 
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were expected to use the same lending criteria regardless of where in 
a community a borrower planned to purchase a home.
96
 Therefore, in 
theory, similarly situated families would receive identical mortgage 
rates and terms regardless of who they were or where they wanted to 
purchase a home.
97
 
Initially, the CRA did little to improve lending to low-income and 
minority neighborhoods.
98
 However, by the late 1980s and during the 
early 1990s, it began to reshape the mortgage lending landscape.
99
 
Critics during the late 1980s complained that the CRA was not as 
effective as it should have been, and in response, Congress held a 
series of public hearings to discuss the future of the Act.
100
 In 
response to the hearings, the regulatory agencies responsible for CRA 
enforcement joined together in 1989 to issue a joint policy statement 
outlining new guidelines for lending procedures and CRA 
enforcement.
101
 The agencies vowed to increase enforcement and 
deny mergers to banks that did not include CRA compliance 
measures in their merger plans.
102
 The regulatory agencies followed 
through on their promises of increased examination of acquisition 
and merger requests, but, beyond those examinations, the government 
took little action to ensure the goals of the CRA came to fruition.
103
 
 
community needs to federal regulatory agencies. Id. at 26–27. The intent was to ―require the 
federal banking regulatory agencies ‗to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs 
of the local communities . . . with the safe and sound operation of such institutions.‘‖ Richard 
D. Marsico, Subprime Lending, Predatory Lending, and the Community Reinvestment Act 
Obligations of Banks, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 735, 736–37 (2002–2003) (quoting 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2901(b)). 
 96. Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 15. 
 97. Id. Unfortunately, racial discrimination remains a serious problem in the housing 
market even today. See SCHWARTZ 2d, supra note 23, at 317–19. 
 98. See generally McKinley, supra note 37, at 27. 
 99. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 242–43; McKinley, supra note 37, at 25–28. 
 100. See generally McKinley, supra note 37, at 27. At one Congressional hearing in 1989, 
the CRA‘s main sponsor, Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin, ―complained that, despite passage of 
the CRA, inner-city neighborhoods were [still] ‗starving for credit.‘‖ Id.; see also Essene & 
Apgar, supra note 35, at 15–16 (―[U]nderserved markets continued to lack access to credit, and 
racial disparities persisted. Documenting these challenges was the ground-breaking, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning ‗Color of Money‘ series in the Atlanta Journal Constitution, which raised 
concerns about the ongoing racial disparities in access to mortgage loans and the lack of 
enforcement of the CRA and fair lending laws.‖). 
 101. Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 15.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  
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In the early 1990s, transformations in the financial services 
industry allowed increased mortgage lending to occur outside the 
regulation of the CRA.
104
 Depositories that were traditionally 
regulated by the CRA began forming subsidiaries and affiliates as a 
way to avoid the rigors of regulation.
105
 Additionally, technological 
advances led to an increase in the number of large, independent 
mortgage lenders.
106
 The new, large lenders used the new technology 
to tap into global, non-deposit-based funding resources and to reach 
borrowers over great geographic distances.
107
  
The evolution of the financial services industry undermined the 
basic goal of the CRA: to support mortgage financing in communities 
with deposited funds from within that community.
108
 At President 
Clinton‘s request, a new framework for evaluating CRA compliance 
was implemented in 1995.
109
 The new regulations attempted to bring 
objectivity to the compliance examinations and to increase disclosure 
among actors involved in different types of lending activities.
110
 But 
the modest changes, which failed to ―fundamentally rethink . . . [or] 
potentially realign the rationale for the CRA,‖ came perhaps too late, 
as other, alternative means of lending to low-income or minority 
families became increasingly popular among lenders.
111
 
D. Financial Deregulation as a Catalyst for Increased  
Low-Income Lending 
By the mid-2000s, the majority of mortgage lending to low-
income and minority borrowers occurred outside the channels of the 
 
 104. Id. at 16. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 16–17 (―Emerging technology in data processing and telecommunications 
encouraged the growth of large banking operations . . . .‖). 
 107. Id.  
 108. See id. at 17. For a full discussion of CRA developments during the 1990s, see id. at 
16–18. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 17. The new regulations focused on ―specific performance measurements,‖ and 
―required greater disclosure on a range of lending‖ activities. Id. Additionally, the regulations 
created a set of new tests to assess whether institutions were in compliance with the CRA. Id. 
The tests varied based upon the size and the types of financial dealings of a given institution. 
See id.  
 111. Id.  
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CRA, primarily through the growing subprime mortgage market.
112
 
Although the subprime mortgage market did not gain national 
attention until the mid- to late 1990s, the origins of its growth lie in 
the financial deregulation of the 1980s.
113
 With the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 (DIDA),
114
 President Carter set 
a ―deregulatory snowball‖ into motion.115 Before DIDA, lenders were 
not able to charge borrowers the high rates and fees commonly 
associated with subprime mortgage products.
116
 DIDA eliminated 
interest rate caps which encouraged subprime lending, as lenders 
were allowed to offer less-creditworthy borrowers financing at higher 
interest rates than ever before.
117
  
The wave of deregulation that began with DIDA only intensified 
in subsequent administrations.
118
 Two years after the enactment of 
DIDA, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA)
119
 
allowed for further new mortgage features, namely balloon payments 
and variable interest rates.
120
 Together, DIDA and AMTPA ―opened 
the door for the development of the subprime market.‖121 However, it 
was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA),
122
 which attached tax 
incentives to mortgage debt, that truly allowed the subprime market 
to become viable.
123
 By incentivizing the exchange of consumer debt 
 
 112. Id. at 12.  
 113. See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 36–38. 
 114. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.). 
 115. Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and 
Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 17, 30 (2008). 
 116. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 38. 
 117. DIDA was provided for the orderly phasing-out, and ultimately the elimination, of 
interest rate ceilings, while simultaneously allowing states to opt-out of the regulations. See 
Marc J. Lifset & Kathryn J. Sheingold, The Law of DIDA Section 501, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 
122, 126 (2000), for an overview of the DIDA interest rate ceiling regulations. See also 
Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 38. 
 118. Jacoby, supra note 115, at 30.  
 119. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3806 
(2006)). 
 120. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 38. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 336–469 
(2006)). 
 123. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 38. After the TRA passed, 
mortgage debt became more desirable than consumer debt. Id. Homeowners could claim a 
deduction for interest on their mortgages, while interest paid on other, more common consumer 
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for mortgage debt, interest in purchasing homes and refinancing 
existing mortgages rose.
124
 For less-creditworthy borrowers, the 
subprime mortgage market became their best option to qualify for the 
tax incentives.
125
 
The final blow to the remnants of the Depression-era financial 
regulations that were originally created to prevent similar economic 
collapses in the future was the Financial Services Modernization Act 
of 1999, more commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA).
126
 The new regulatory system created under GLBA left 
commercial banks ―relatively free of regulatory oversight‖ as they 
pursued new financial services opportunities, like securitization.
127
  
All of the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s coupled with the 
developments in mortgage finance ―spilled over into the new 
millennium in the form of an equally dramatic explosion of new 
subprime mortgage products.‖128  
E. The Expansion of the Secondary Mortgage Market  
The world of housing finance evolved from the days before the 
Great Depression when only the affluent could afford mortgages.
129
 
By the end of the 1930s, there were ―two distinct circuits of mortgage 
finance, each quite insulated from the rest of the financial sector:‖130 
uninsured mortgage loans granted by thrifts
131
 and federally-insured 
 
loans remained non-deductible. Id. Additionally, prime borrowing rates dropped around the 
time the TRA passed, and many lenders turned ―to the subprime market to maintain volume.‖ 
Id. 
 124. See id.  
 125. See id. 
 126. Jolina C. Cuaresma, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 497, 497 
(2002). GLBA not only destroyed the remnants of Depression-era financial regulations, it also 
addressed and raised serious privacy concerns. See generally id. 
 127. Jacoby, supra note 115, at 17, 30; see infra notes 129–53 (addressing the 
securitization of mortgages). 
 128. Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 17. 
 129. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
 130. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 52. 
 131. The term ―thrifts‖ covers a broad range of traditional depository institutions like 
savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. Id. Thrifts typically rely on deposits 
made by local households to cover their mortgage lending needs, taking advances from a 
regional Home Loan Bank when necessary. Id. at 52–53. 
 Twelve regional Home Loan Banks were established by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act 
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mortgage loans granted by non-depository institutions.
132
 Federally 
insured mortgages were rare, and lenders were typically independent 
brokers and mortgage companies that financed their lending with 
borrowed, rather than deposited, funds.
133
 The lenders sold the 
insured mortgages to other financial institutions and investors, thus 
creating the first secondary mortgage market.
134
  
In the early stages of the secondary mortgage market, purchasers 
held mortgages in private portfolios, but beginning in the 1960s, 
institutions began creating early forms of tradable mortgage-backed 
securities.
135
 The first mortgage-backed securities, pass-through 
certificates, offered investors the opportunity to purchase just a share 
in a pool of mortgages rather than purchasing an entire mortgage on 
the secondary market for the first time.
136
 The early pass-through 
securities, however, were not attractive investments, as investors 
fully bore the risks like borrower prepayment or default.
137
 
Eventually, mortgage-backed bonds replaced mortgage-backed 
securities.
138
 Investors were able to purchase bonds collateralized by 
a pool of mortgages rather than purchasing a direct share of the pool 
itself.
139
 The new securities ―further integrated housing finance with 
other financial markets,‖ and allowed global investors to purchase 
mortgage-backed bonds just as they would any other corporate or 
government bond.
140
  
Initially, the mortgage bond market centered on bonds backed by 
prime mortgages, but it eventually extended to include bonds backed 
by both prime mortgages and also subprime mortgages granted to 
less-creditworthy borrowers.
141
 The inclusion of subprime mortgage 
 
of 1932. Id. at 48. Home Loan Banks provided more liquidity to thrifts by infusing them with 
instant capital in the event that the demand for mortgage financing exceeded the amount that a 
thrift‘s deposits could cover. Id. For a more thorough discussion of the role Home Loan Banks 
played in reforming the housing finance system, see id. at 48–53. 
 132. Id. at 52–53. 
 133. Id. at 53. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 57. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 57–58. 
 138. Id. at 57.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 57–58. 
 141. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 6 (2010).  
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debt in the bonds led to the formation of significantly more 
mortgage-backed bonds,
142
 but bond investors faced the same fear of 
prepayment as investors in earlier mortgage-backed securities.
143
 The 
bonds represented a mere ―claim on the cash flows from a pool of 
thousands of individual mortgages.‖144 If interest rates fell, borrowers 
typically repaid their mortgages early by refinancing, and bond 
holders received their returns at a time when reinvestment was an 
unattractive option due to the lower interest rates.
145
  
The financial services industry responded and created new 
features to provide more certainty to investors as to how long an 
investment would last and to make mortgage-backed bonds 
significantly more attractive to investors than ever before.
146
 A 
complicated tranche system was developed to offer investors 
different degrees of protection by dividing the payments made on the 
mortgages in a pool into different risk and return categories from 
which investors could choose.
147
 With the creation of the tranche 
system, the popularity of the mortgage bond market exploded and 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 7; SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 57–58.  
 144. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 7. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 6–7. 
 147. Id. at 7. Salomon Brothers, a major player in the creation of a successful mortgage 
bond market, created a tranche system to try to draw otherwise reluctant investors to the 
mortgage-backed bond market. Id. When creating the bonds, pools of mortgage loans were 
combined and then the payments were divided into separate levels, or tranches, each with 
different degrees of risk and opportunities for rates of return. Id. As Michael Lewis describes it 
in easily understood terms in The Big Short: 
The buyer of the first tranche was like the owner of the ground floor in a flood: He got 
hit with the first wave of mortgage prepayments. In exchange, he received a higher 
interest rate. The buyer of the second tranche—the second story of the skyscraper—
took the next wave of prepayments and in exchange received the second highest 
interest rate, and so on. The investor in the top floor of the building received the lowest 
rate of interest but had the greatest assurance that his investment wouldn‘t end before 
he wanted it to. 
Id. This system, created in the 1980s, showed that investors feared being repaid too soon, as 
opposed to the fear some twenty-five years later that they may never be repaid at all. See id. 
Eventually the idea of mortgage-backed bonds expanded to include bonds backed not only by 
prime loans but also bonds backed by subprime loans. Investors in the bottom tranche absorbed 
the risk of mortgage loan defaults rather than of prepayment-related losses. Id. at 8. For a 
discussion of the irrationality of the tranche system, and the related investment rating system, 
during the period leading up to the crash of the mortgage bond market, see id. at 100–03. 
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―extended Wall Street into a place it had never before been: the debts 
of ordinary Americans.‖148  
One main reason that the fear of early prepayment discouraged 
early investment in mortgage-backed bonds was because, at first, 
each individual mortgage in a pool conformed to so-called ―safe‖ 
lending standards, and the federal government insured the individual 
mortgages in the event that a borrower defaulted.
149
 Borrowers, in the 
beginning, were typically more fluid and were able to refinance 
mortgages when interest rates dropped. Investors then received the 
returns on their investments at a time when interest rates were low 
and reinvesting, therefore, was less attractive. Government insured 
mortgages often led to the same result for investors if a borrower 
defaulted during a time when interest rates were low. But, over time, 
lenders relaxed underwriting standards, and subprime mortgage 
financing was extended to less creditworthy borrowers.
150
 Wall Street 
pooled mortgages granted to less-creditworthy borrowers together 
with prime mortgages and used the tranche system to address the 
threat of non-payment of uninsured mortgages.
151
 Investors in the 
riskiest tranche bore the risk of actual losses rather than just of 
prepayment, but, admittedly, the degree of risk in any given 
investment was unclear due to the work of the credit rating 
agencies
152
 who were less than transparent and did not react and 
adjust their ratings as subprime lenders labeled mortgage defaults as 
 
 148. Id. at 6. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 8.  
 151. Id. 
 152. Credit-rating agencies, or Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs), exist to protect investors. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Seven 
Credit Rating Agencies Register with SEC as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-199. 
htm. NRSROs review financial statistics and, through different processes and methodologies, 
assign ratings to financial institutions and potential investments. Id. The ratings inform potential 
investors about the soundness of an institution or investment instrument. Id.; see also Oversight 
of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM‘N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tmcompliance/nrsro-
secg.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2009) (defining ―credit rating agency‖ and explaining how to 
register as an NRSRO).  
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prepayments because ―‗[i]nvoluntary prepayment‘ sounds better than 
‗default.‘‖153 
With the increased attractiveness of mortgage-backed bonds, the 
subprime lending industry also exploded. During a first subprime 
boom in the early 1990s, subprime mortgage lenders began taking 
their businesses public in increasing numbers.
154
 The ease with which 
lenders could dispose of the risk of lending in the marketplace 
attracted an abundant number of bad actors to the industry.
155
 
Subprime lenders used ―goofy accounting‖ to create what was 
essentially a giant Ponzi scheme.
156
 Following on the heels of the 
collapse of a large hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, 
which signified trouble in the markets, the subprime lenders of the 
1990s had difficulty finding capital to finance their businesses and 
many entered bankruptcy.
157
 By 2002, there were no more publicly 
traded subprime lenders.
158
 
It did not take long, however, for the subprime lending industry to 
recover. As home values around the United States skyrocketed, 
securitized mortgages ―became tools for speculative, short-term 
investments and a means to access easy cash.‖159 By 2005, subprime 
lending was back in full swing.
160
 In the 1990s, a $30 billion year 
―was a big year for subprime lending.‖161 In 2000, before the fall of 
the first subprime lending boom, the industry had a $130 billion year, 
with $55 billion worth of mortgages repackaged into bonds.
162
 But by 
2005, subprime mortgage lending was a $625 billion industry,
163
 and 
 
 153. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 14.  
 154. Id. at 9–10.  
 155. Id. at 9 (―Because the lenders sold many—though not all—of the loans they made to 
other investors, in the form of mortgage bonds, the industry was also fraught with moral hazard. 
‗It was the fast buck business,‘ says [Sy] Jacobs [, an employee of the small investment Alex 
Brown]. ‗Any business where you can sell a product and make money without having to worry 
how the product performs is going to attract sleazy people.‘‖).  
 156. Id. at 14. In September 1997, a report published by a Wall Street fund manager 
attacked the accounting methods of the subprime lenders of the 1990s. Id. at 14–16. 
 157. Id. at 15.  
 158. Id. at 16.  
 159. TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. 
 160. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 27. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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a whopping $507 billion of those mortgages were pooled into 
mortgage bonds.
164
  
At the same time, interest rates rose steadily, and subprime 
mortgages evolved to include new, often misleading or predatory, 
features.
165
 Fixed-rate subprime mortgages were replaced by newer, 
confusing mortgages with adjustable rates. Borrowers often did not 
fully appreciate the complexity of their loans and did not understand 
that they were taking on more debt than they could afford.
166
 Less 
creditworthy, low-income, and minority borrowers, in particular, 
were taken advantage of by subprime lenders who often used 
predatory lending practices to make unsound loans while knowing 
they easily could shift the burden of their risky lending onto investors 
in the secondary market.
167
 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. There also was a significant decline in lending standards. Id. at 27. For 
example, 65 percent of subprime loans had fixed interest rates in 1996. Id. at 23. But, by 2005, 
75 percent of subprime mortgages had adjustable rates that made it difficult to predict future 
monthly payments accurately. Id. The worst mortgages were interest-only negative-amortizing 
adjustable-rate subprime mortgages. Id. at 27–28. Borrowers with those mortgages ended up 
owing more than their homes were worth and had to deal with mortgages that lacked clear 
repayment plans. Id. It was not surprising that borrowers jumped at what appeared to be a great 
opportunity to own a home with low monthly payments, but what was truly surprising was that 
lenders were so willing to behave irrationally. Id. at 28 (―‗The borrowers will always be willing 
to take a great deal for themselves. It‘s up to the lenders to show restraint, and when they lose 
it, watch out.‘‖).  
 167. See TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 6, 8. There is no exhaustive list 
or agreed upon definition of predatory lending because ―bad actors are constantly developing 
new abusive practices, sometimes to evade new government regulation.‖ U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. 
& URBAN DEV.—TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY 
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 17 (2000), available at http://www.huduscr.org/publications/pdf/ 
treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]. Also, such a list would ―fail[] to convey that 
predatory lending is as much a function of the manner in which the loans are made as the 
oppressive terms that they contain.‖ Id. at 18. 
 There are, however, ―overarching characteristics of predatory loans‖ which emerge 
primarily in the subprime mortgage market. Id. at 17. Subprime borrowers are more at risk for 
predatory terms for several reasons. Subprime borrowers are less likely to shop among lenders 
for more advantageous loan terms because they are aware that their less than ideal credit 
histories make them undesirable loan candidates. Id. at 18. Subprime borrowers typically ―live 
in low-income and minority communities that are comparatively underserved by traditional 
prime lenders,‖ and the lack of competition among lenders decreases the likelihood of obtaining 
better loan terms. Id. Additionally, prime lenders tend to be banks, thrifts, and credit unions 
which are subjected to more strenuous federal regulation than the subprime mortgage and 
finance companies. Id. The lower degree of federal oversight leads to less accountability for 
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The subprime industry did, however, learn an important lesson 
from the days of ―goofy accounting‖ that sunk lenders a few years 
earlier: passing on the burden of risky mortgages was essential to 
their survival.
168
 While the lesson learned should have been not to 
make loans to borrowers who cannot repay them, greed controlled 
instead.
169
 Lenders made bad loans that the largest investment banks 
were more than willing to buy, bundle, and resell on the secondary 
market without weighing the soundness of their purchases.
170
 
Remarkably, even when it became clear that adjustable-rate 
mortgages, which were almost exclusively subprime mortgages, were 
going into default, lenders still did not raise their underwriting 
standards.
171
 The rating agencies did not react.
172
 Rather, business on 
Wall Street continued as usual.  
By 2006, home prices began to fall consistently for the first time 
since the Great Depression.
173
 The ―slow and possibly fraudulent 
unraveling‖ of the mortgage bond market became the ―opportunity of 
a lifetime‖ for traders, but it was nearly catastrophic for the United 
States‘ economy.174 Even as the loans, primarily subprime, that 
served as collateral for mortgage bonds entered default at an alarming 
rate, the rating agencies still did not react or adjust their ratings of the 
soundness of mortgage bonds.
175
 By June 2007, the subprime 
mortgage market was crumbling, but Wall Street seemingly ignored 
the warning signs and stood by idly as the mortgage-backed bond 
market crumbled as well.
176
  
Risky financial decisions based on the faulty premise that housing 
prices could not fall consistently destroyed the nation‘s financial 
system,
177
 as what started in the secondary mortgage market quickly 
 
subprime lenders and ―may create an environment where predatory practices flourish because 
they are unlikely to be detected.‖ Id. 
 168. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 23–24. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 24. 
 171. Id. at 59. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 94–95; TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 5. 
 174. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 167. 
 175. Id. at 169–70. 
 176. Id. at 172, 194, 219. 
 177. TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 4–5.  
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devolved into a broader financial crisis. Bear Stearns, a key player in 
the mortgage-backed bond market,
178
 collapsed in March 2008, and 
by September 2008 the dire economic situation was finally clear.
179
 
Lehman Brothers, another large financial services firm and key 
market player, filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.
180
 Bank 
of America bought Merrill Lynch after it announced losses in excess 
of $55 billion due to its dealings in the subprime-backed bond 
market.
181
 That same week the ―Federal Reserve announced that it 
had lent $85 billion to the insurance company AIG, to pay off the 
losses on the subprime credit default swaps AIG had sold to Wall 
Street banks.‖182 The stock market dropped drastically,183 and it 
became clear that the economy would not bounce back quickly.  
F. Federal Responses to the Great Recession 
By the time the government took steps to rescue failing financial 
institutions in October 2008, it was too late—the damage was 
done.
184
 What began as a foreclosure crisis quickly devolved into a 
complex, worldwide economic crisis.
185
 The housing market that had 
 
 178. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 24 (―By early 2005 all the big Wall Street investment banks 
were deep into the subprime game. Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley all had what they termed ‗shelves‘ for their subprime wares with strange names . . . that 
made it a bit more difficult . . . to see that these subprime bonds were being underwritten by 
Wall Street‘s biggest names.‖). 
 179. See id. at 234–37. 
 180. Id. at 237. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. A credit default swap operates, more or less, like an insurance policy. A party pays 
a premium for a defined period of time and bets against the future success of a bond. If the debt 
underlying the bond enters default, the party stands to earn a substantial return on their 
investment. See id. at 29–31 (illustrating how a credit default swap operates and how investors 
used them to bet against mortgage-backed bonds).  
 183. Id. at 237. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., Elvis Has Left the Mountain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, 
§ WK, at 9. (―We have woven such a tangled financial mess with subprime mortgages wrapped 
in complex bonds and derivatives, pumped up with leverage, and then globalized to the far 
corners of the earth . . . .‖). In the second quarter of 2008, the grim economic outlook grew 
bleaker as federally insured banking institutions as a whole earned only $5 billion in profits, 
$31.8 billion less than was earned in the second quarter of 2007 and the second-lowest recorded 
quarterly net profit since 1991. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SECOND QUARTER 2008 (Aug. 
26, 2008), http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2008jun/qbpall.html. Four banks failed during the first 
two quarters of 2008. Id. In the third quarter, the net income of insured institutions dropped to 
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peaked at unnaturally high levels was decimated by the last quarter of 
2008 when home equity, home prices, and new and existing home 
sales dropped dramatically.
186
  
In the wake of the economic meltdown, several key pieces of 
legislation
187
 were passed to stabilize both the housing market and the 
financial system as a whole. First, on September 19, 2008, then-
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. proposed a bailout scheme to 
rescue struggling financial institutions and stabilize the banking 
industry.
188
 Paulson‘s original plan was unpopular, however, and 
failed to garner congressional support, but a similar plan was enacted 
on October 3, 2008.
189
 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
 
$1.7 billion, a 94 percent decline from the net income of the third quarter of 2007, and bank 
failures hit a fifteen-year quarterly high. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THIRD QUARTER 2008 (Nov. 
25, 2008), http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2008sep/qbpall.html [hereinafter FDIC THIRD QUARTER]. 
In July 2008, IndyMac Bank—which had $28 billion in assets, more than all the 31 banks that 
failed since 2007 combined—failed and was placed in a federal receivership. FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (June 18, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/ 
2008annualreport/statements_dif_4.html. Washington Mutual Bank also failed during the third 
quarter and had $307 billion in assets, more than ten times the assets of IndyMac, at the time of 
failure. Compare FDIC THIRD QUARTER, supra (noting the value of Washington Mutual‘s 
assets at the time it failed), with 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra (discussing the creation of 
IndyMac Federal Bank after IndyMac Bank failed). The third quarter of 2008 marked the first 
time in over fourteen years that assets of financial institutions on the FDIC‘s troubled 
institutions list exceeded $100 billion. FDIC THIRD QUARTER, supra.  
 186. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 2 (―From their quarterly peaks during the 
housing boom to the last quarter of 2008, real home equity was down 41 percent, existing 
median home prices 27 percent . . . and existing home sales 33 percent.‖).  
 187. The government made several attempts to save the housing market. Initiatives like the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program aim to revive foreclosed properties to prevent 
neighborhood blight. Id. at 3. The bailout package and the stimulus bill were directed at the 
economic system as a whole. Other programs, like Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure (PTFA), 
assist renters inadvertently affected when their landlords enter foreclosure. See generally id. 
(describing housing policy and the housing market in the wake of the foreclosure crisis); see 
also Danilo Pelletiere & Danna Fischer, Foreclosure Intervention: Protecting Renters, NAT‘L 
LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (May 6, 2009), http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id= 
6046&id=163 (providing an overview of laws available to tenants‘ rights advocates).  
 188. Credit Crisis-Bailout Plan (TARP), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/ 
reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/bailout_plan/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 
2010).  
 189. Id. Paulson originally asked for $700 billion to purchase mortgage backed securities 
that were rendered valueless. Id. Had Paulson followed his own proposal, the government 
would have purchased the securities at inflated rates, giving firms an infusion of much-needed 
capital and improving their chances of weathering the crisis. Id. However, even when given 
similar authority under the bailout bill, Paulson opted not to purchase troubled assets or to 
address housing needs. See infra notes 187–96 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
500 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:473 
 
 
2008,
190
 the bailout bill, established the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP).
191
 The program appropriated $700 billion to the 
Treasury Secretary to buy troubled assets, including mortgages, from 
struggling financial institutions.
192
 The Treasury also gained the 
power to regulate executive compensation and other monetary 
incentives for institutions that receive TARP funds, and the 
government took away certain compensation-related tax breaks from 
financial institutions receiving assistance.
193
  
On February 13, 2009, President Obama signed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the ―Stimulus‖),194 which 
authorized $787 billion in new federal spending.
195
 The President 
intended to use Stimulus funds to invest in both job creation and 
long-term economic growth plans in an attempt to rebuild the 
struggling economy.
196
 As of July 2010, the White House estimated 
that the Stimulus either saved or created between 2.5 and 3.6 million 
jobs.
197
 The White House also noted that private investors matched 
every dollar in federal Stimulus funds invested to promote growth by 
spending three of their own.
198
 Despite the proclaimed success of the 
Stimulus, the national unemployment rate hovered around 10 percent 
 
 190. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).  
 191. Id. at tit. I § 101.  
 192. Id. at tit. I. § 101; see also Alice Gomstyn, Bailout Bill Basics: From TARP to Tax 
Breaks, ABC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/Story?id= 
5932586&page=1 (providing a basic outline of the bailout bill‘s provisions).  
 193. Gomstyn, supra note 192. 
 194. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 195. The Recovery Act, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act. 
aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).  
 196. Id. Several of the new programs created by the Stimulus directly address housing-
related problems. See U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD ECONOMIC STIMULUS 
FUNDING AND THE CREATION OF JOBS, TRAINING, AND THE CREATION OF JOBS, TRAINING, AND 
CONTRACTING OPPORTUNITIES (2010), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/section3/ 
Econ-Stimulus-sec3-final.pdf, and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, NAT‘L 
ASSOC. OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/government_affairs/gapublic/american_recovery 
_reinvestment_act_home (last visited Oct. 22, 2010), for brief overviews of how the Stimulus 
impacts housing matters.  
 197. Associated Press, New White House Report Claims More Jobs from Stimulus Bill, 
U.S. NEWS, July 14, 2010, http://politics.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/07/14/new-white-
house-report-claims-more-jobs-from-stimulus-bill.html.  
 198. Id.  
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in July,
199
 while underemployment forced many families into 
poverty.
200
  
Minorities, people without high school diplomas, and people with 
disabilities face the highest unemployment rates, as many of the jobs 
lost come from industries that do not require higher education.
201
 
These same groups historically have ―high proportions of low-income 
households.‖202 Low-income families are also far more likely to be 
renters and burdened by excessive housing costs.
203
 As renters, low-
income families were in a particularly difficult position due to the 
foreclosure crisis and the economic meltdown. 
Beyond the Stimulus, the Obama Administration has taken steps 
aimed solely at stabilizing the housing market and rescuing 
homeowners struggling to pay their mortgages.
204
 Together with 
Congress, the Administration moved to expand tax credits available 
to first-time homebuyers to stimulate the housing market and to 
strengthen consumer protection laws.
205
 Efforts were made to support 
community development and neighborhood stabilization programs 
and to provide support to state and local housing agencies working to 
help low-income tenants.
206
 
Further, on May 20, 2009, President Obama signed the Protecting 
Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (PFTA)
207
 which aimed to 
address many of the problems tenants faced if their landlords lost the 
properties they rented to foreclosure.
208
 Under PTFA, any bona fide 
 
 199. Id. At the end of 2007, early in the recession, the unemployment rate was only 5 
percent. NAT‘L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2010, at 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2010/oor2010pub.pdf [hereinafter OUT OF REACH 2010]. 
 200. NAT‘L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2009, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009/oor2009pub.pdf [hereinafter OUT OF REACH 2009]. 
 201. OUT OF REACH 2010, supra note 199, at 4. 
 202. Id. 
 203. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 16.  
 204. TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 9. For example, the Joint Report 
credits the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 with creating new regulations aimed at curbing the types of 
abuses that caused substantial instability in the housing and other financial markets. Id. at 11. 
 205. Id. at 9. 
 206. Id.  
 207. Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1660 (2009). PTFA was passed as Title VII of the larger 
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009).  
 208. See Press Release, Nat‘l Low Income Housing Coalition, Renters Have Immediate 
Protections from Foreclosure Under New Bill (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.nlihc. 
org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=6140&id=48. 
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tenant
209
 who entered into a lease with a landlord before the property 
entered foreclosure is entitled to remain in their home until the end of 
their lease term.
210
 If the property is sold before the natural end of a 
tenant‘s lease, then the purchaser must honor that lease, unless they 
intend to use the property as their primary residence.
211
 PTFA also 
recognizes that many low-income tenants have either month-to-
month leases or do not have written leases at all.
212
 If that is the case, 
PTFA requires that the new owner, whether it be an individual or a 
bank, provide the tenant with a ninety-day notice before filing for 
eviction.
213
  
In addition to creating roadblocks to immediate eviction, PTFA 
requires that the new owner assume any state landlord-tenant law 
obligations.
214
 For Section 8 voucher-holders, PTFA goes one step 
farther: new owners must not only respect the requirements of 
Section 8 leases, but also must accept the Housing Assistance 
Payments from local housing authorities so that tenants do not lose 
their vouchers.
215
 
In February 2011, the Treasury and HUD issued a report to 
Congress that included a drastic shift in national housing policy.
216
 
The Obama Administration committed to improving access to 
affordable housing, while recognizing that not every American 
should own a home.
217
 In the report, the Treasury and HUD laid out a 
plan for restructuring and rebuilding the American housing finance 
system. The plan identified several fundamental flaws in the current 
 
 209. Memorandum from Nat‘l Low Income Hous. Coal. on Prots. for Tenants in 
Foreclosed Props. (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.nlihc.org/doc/Memo-Renter-
Protections-S-896.pdf. Under PTFA, a bona fide tenant is a tenant who is neither the owner of 
the property nor a close family relative of the owner. Id. The lease formation must be an ―arms-
length‖ transaction entered into for fair market rental value. Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See generally TREASURY/HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 15. While the report 
primarily proposes options for winding down the Government Sponsored Enterprises, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, it also describes the future role of the government in the housing world 
as one of ―robust oversight and consumer protection‖ and of ―targeted assistance‖ rather than 
one of unconditional support for increased homeownership for all. Id. at 1. 
 217. Id. at 2.  
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system, including: poor consumer protections that allowed for the 
creation of too many bad mortgages; an outdated regulatory regime; 
and a lack of transparency, accountability and proper capitalization to 
protect against unacceptable levels of risk.
218
 
II. ANALYSIS 
In 1949, Congress first committed to ensuring ―a decent home and 
a suitable living environment for every American family,‖219 and 
since then has declared better meeting the housing needs of lower 
income Americans a matter of ―grave national concern.‖220 Before the 
Great Depression, only the most affluent could afford to own a home, 
a trend that continued in the post-Depression era, as well.
221
 The 
introduction of public housing in 1937 provided safe, affordable 
homes to members of the ―submerged middle class,‖ the working 
poor who could not afford the high costs of renting or buying in the 
private market.
222
  
New banking and finance-related legislation passed in the years 
after the Great Depression paved the way for increased access to low-
cost homeownership for the then-thriving and expanding middle 
class.
223
 As a result, the demographics of public housing residents 
shifted to include almost exclusively low- and very-low income 
families.
224
 Public housing developments also were typically located 
in low-income and minority neighborhoods, areas where it was 
 
 218. See id. at 5–7 (listing several fundamental flaws and the damage they each caused).  
 219. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 90-19, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 220. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (2006); see also 
supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 221. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 13, 47; see also supra notes 52–54 and 60–62 and 
accompanying text.  
 222. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 102, 105.  
 223. See id. at 48–52. 
 224. Id. at 105. While public housing always has been attractive to low-income families, 
―over time, the public housing population has become increasingly impoverished.‖ Id. After 
World War II, however, the middle class began to leave public housing. Id. The median income 
of public housing residents dropped drastically ―from 57% of the national median in 1950 to . . . 
less than 20% by the mid-1990s.‖ Id. at 129. 
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difficult to secure mortgage financing, providing further incentive for 
low-income families to live in public housing.
225
 
Low-income and minority families seeking mortgage financing 
before the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 faced 
considerable discrimination, as lenders refused to finance home 
purchases in certain neighborhoods based primarily on an area‘s 
racial composition.
226
 The federal government did not merely allow 
lenders to openly discriminate, it promoted discriminatory redlining 
practices until Congress stepped in and passed the Fair Housing 
Act.
227
 
The Fair Housing Act was effective as a broad policy statement 
against discrimination in the sale or rental of residential properties.
228
 
While it represented a definite shift away from open federal support 
for redlining, the Act was not without negative consequences on 
minority neighborhoods. Lenders faced no risk in lending, as the 
Federal Housing Authority insured their loans, and often relaxed their 
underwriting standards.
229
 As a result, even high-risk borrowers could 
secure financing, but the Federal Housing Authority failed to step in 
and prevent lenders from taking advantage of them.
230
 
In a striking parallel to the foreclosure crisis, the effects of the 
resulting foreclosures and abandoned homes in low-income, typically 
minority, neighborhoods caused greater neighborhood instability and 
blight.
231
 Even though local residents deposited their money in local 
financial institutions, the same institutions remained hesitant to lend 
money back to the residents to finance neighborhood home 
purchases.
232
 Residents were stuck choosing between abusive lending 
practices or not owning a home in hopes of helping to stabilize their 
 
 225. Id. at 106–07; see id. at 51–52.  
 226. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 227. Id.  
 228. See generally supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.  
 229. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 87, at 96.  
 230. Id. Meanwhile, real estate agents and mortgage brokers earned large commissions 
selling homes in the same areas, particularly when they could resell post-foreclosure properties. 
Id. 
 231. Id.  
 232. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 66. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Rebuilding a House of Cards 505 
 
 
communities. With this roadblock in mind, Congress passed the 
Community Reinvestment Act.
233
 
At the time the CRA was passed, it is without a doubt that 
something needed to be done to counteract racial and economic 
discrimination in mortgage lending. Homeownership is an essential 
wealth-building tool for many households;
234
 however, if redlining 
continued, low-income families in distressed, urban neighborhoods 
would never be able to lift themselves or their communities out of 
poverty. Requiring lenders to help finance homeownership in their 
local communities was an excellent attempt to rectify the problem, 
but the CRA lacked the enforcement and procedural mechanisms 
necessary to truly make an impact. 
The federal agencies charged with oversight duties approved 
almost every proposed bank merger regardless of whether the post-
merger bank would comply with CRA requirements.
235
 The required 
periodic evaluations were essentially meaningless, as almost every 
lending institution received one of the two highest ratings 
available.
236
 Even after the revision of the CRA guidelines in 1989, 
the federal agencies in charge of oversight and implementation of the 
CRA failed to put their full regulatory weight behind the Act.
237
 
At a time when the CRA was losing impact, GLBA‘s deregulation 
measures struck a serious blow to arguments in favor of creating 
serious, functional regulatory guidelines under the CRA.
238
 Fair 
housing advocates remained silent out of fear that the CRA would be 
the next piece of legislation to be repealed in the climate of 
deregulation.
239
 Ultimately, lenders shied away from lending to 
minority communities through CRA channels in favor of selling 
subprime products, and no one was willing to take a strong stance in 
support of the legislation and its goals.
240
 
 
 233. Id.  
 234. See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 18, at 31.  
 235. Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 15.  
 236. Id.  
 237. See id. at 16–19. 
 238. Id. at 17.  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 17–18. 
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In the deregulated financial world of the late 1990s, most lending 
to minority and low-income borrowers began to take place outside 
the reach of CRA regulation.
241
 As a result, the real barrier for low-
income and minority communities became access to fair credit rather 
than simply access to credit.
242
 At first glance, the subprime products 
that emerged as a result of deregulation appeared to help low-income 
and minority communities invest in stability.
243
 Housing advocates, 
however, began warning against predatory lending practices, 
suggesting that many low-income and minority borrowers were 
―tak[ing] on mortgage obligations that they did not understand or 
were unable to pay.‖244 Seemingly, the CRA‘s goal of increasing 
access to mortgage financing in minority and low-income 
communities succeeded, even if it mostly succeeded outside of the 
watchful eye of the regulators. The disturbing reality of the situation 
was not immediately apparent. 
Pundits argue over the role of the CRA in creating the economic 
crisis,
245
 but whether the CRA caused the crisis is, besides being 
irrelevant, highly unlikely. The government and regulatory agencies 
ignored the CRA for most of its history, and, in reality, only a very 
small percentage of subprime mortgages involved in the failed 
mortgage-backed bonds came from CRA channels.
246
 What the CRA 
 
 241. Id. at 18. In 2006, just 10 percent of all loans made in lower-income areas by financial 
institutions regulated by the CRA were CRA-related, yet 34 percent of all mortgages were 
granted to low-income and minority borrowers. Id. at 12.  
 242. Id. Interestingly, the result of the foreclosure crisis has been to resurrect that barrier to 
access to credit. Id.  
 243. Id. at 18. These communities were not served by prime mortgages, so gaining access 
to credit seemed like a major victory. Id.  
 244. Id.  
 245. See, e.g., Aaron Pressman, Community Reinvestment Act Had Nothing to Do with 
Subprime Crisis, BUS. WK. (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/ 
blog/archives/2008/09/community_reinvestment_act_had_nothing_to_do_with_subprime_crisis
.html; John Carney, Here’s How The Community Reinvestment Act Led to the Housing Bubble’s 
Lax Lending, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2009, 9:33 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cra-
debate-a-users-guide-2009-6; Media Conservaties Baselessly Blame Community Reinvestment 
Act for Foreclosure Spike, MEDIA MATTERS (Sept. 30, 2008, 2:06 PM), http://mediamatters. 
org/research/200809300012. The Federal Reserve, however, denies that the CRA played any 
role in the foreclosure crisis. See Press Release, Comm. on Fin. Servs., Federal Reserve States 
CRA Played No Part in Foreclosure Crisis Financial Institutions Chairman Brings Republican 
Myth to Light (Mar. 12, 2009), available at https://financialservices.house.gov/press/PR 
Article.aspx?NewsID=466.  
 246. Essene & Apgar, supra note 35, at 12.  
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truly achieved was turning lender attention to the fact that there were 
previously untapped borrowers anxiously awaiting the opportunity to 
own a home. 
Mortgage brokers abused the goal of increasing mortgage 
financing for low-income borrowers or borrowers without solid credit 
histories. Lenders, bearing almost no risk for irresponsible lending 
due to the ease of risk-shifting in the secondary mortgage market,
247
 
took advantage of borrowers through predatory lending practices.
248
 
They preyed on low-income and minority borrowers by ignoring 
underwriting standards like debt-to-income ratios and by granting 
mortgages without attempting to verify that borrowers had sufficient 
incomes to repay loans.
249
 
As the subprime mortgages were pooled into bonds with prime 
mortgages, almost no one on Wall Street, including the ratings 
agencies responsible for rating the soundness of potential 
investments, paid attention to the risks the lenders were taking with 
subprime products. The ―goofy accounting‖ of the 1990s was 
forgotten, and most just saw the equity in homes as another asset that 
could become a security.
250
 The tranche system made it easier to 
bundle the ―bad‖ mortgages that were not guaranteed by the 
government in with the ―good‖ mortgages and still attract investors to 
the mortgage-backed bond market with the illusion of easy and safe 
money.
251
 
The ease with which individuals could secure mortgage financing 
led to the highest rate of homeownership the United States had ever 
seen, but the seeming success of more American families achieving 
the American Dream
252
 came at the expense of fiscal responsibility 
 
 247. Mortgage brokers could set up offices in strip malls, make loans to unsophisticated or 
ill-informed borrowers knowing that default was likely, and immediately sell the mortgage to 
another party. Gregory D. Squires, Predatory Lending: Redlining in Reverse, SHELTERFORCE 
ONLINE, Jan.–Feb. 2005, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/139/redlining.html. 
 248. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 249. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 10. 
 250. LEWIS, supra note 141, at 8, 14.  
 251. Id. at 8.  
 252. Homeownership is an essential element of the American Dream. OFFICE OF POLICY 
DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOMEOWNERSHIP: PROGRESS AND 
WORK REMAINING 1 (2000). In his first inaugural address, George Washington referenced for 
the first time the concept of an American Dream: ―the experiment entrusted to the hands of the 
American people.‖ President George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789). 
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and economic stability. The housing market destabilized, and, due to 
the rise in popularity of the secondary mortgage market, housing 
market instability spilled over into the broader financial markets. 
Problems with housing finance long have been troublesome for the 
economy as a whole,
253
 as housing-related expenses account for 
approximately 20 percent of GDP.
254
 Accordingly, what began as a 
foreclosure crisis quickly decimated the American economy. 
Many of the largest banks were wrapped up in the subprime 
debacle in one way or another.
255
 Irresponsible lending, trading, 
investing and leveraging left major financial institutions on the verge 
of bankruptcy, and the federal government announced that it had no 
choice but to step in and bail out the flailing institutions because they 
were too big to fail.
256
 The same bad actors responsible for the 
financial crisis received TARP funds from the bailout bill.
257
 The 
bailout bill was the first of many federal initiatives aimed at saving 
the economy, but the damage was done. The United States was in the 
middle of a deep recession caused by the instability in the banking 
 
Almost a century and a half later, Herbert Hoover attempted to draw support during the Great 
Depression by painting his picture of the American Dream for the American people, saying: 
My conception of America is a land where men and women may walk in ordered 
freedom in the independent conduct of their occupations, where they may enjoy the 
advantages of wealth, not concentrated in the hands of the few but spread through the 
lives of all; where they build and safeguard their homes, and give to their children the 
fullest advantages and opportunities of American life; where every man shall be 
respected in the faith that his conscience and his heart direct him to follow; where a 
contented and happy people, secure in their liberties, free from poverty and fear, shall 
have the leisure and impulse to seek a fuller life.  
President Herbert Hoover, Campaign Speech at Madison Square Garden (Oct. 31, 1932) 
(emphasis added). The idea that everyone can achieve upward mobility through hard work and 
perseverance is at the very core of the American Dream.  
 253. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 6. 
 254. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 3.  
 255. Bear Stearns, the first major investment bank to collapse, bet heavily on the success of 
subprime loans and had to sell itself to J.P. Morgan in March 2008 for a very low price in order 
to avoid bankruptcy. Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, 
at 106. Lehman Brothers, another major Wall Street institution wrapped up in the subprime 
debacle, could not find a buyer and entered bankruptcy in September 2008. LEWIS, supra note 
145, at 237.  
 256. See supra Part I.F (discussing federal actions to rescue the financial sector).  
 257. For a list of financial institutions that received bailout funds, see Bailed Out Banks, 
CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2010).  
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industry, a recession that caused significant job losses and large 
numbers of residential foreclosures.
258
  
The same low-income and minority borrowers taken advantage of 
in the subprime crisis were disproportionately harmed by the broader 
economic crisis, as well.
259
 In the neighborhoods with the highest 
incidence of foreclosure, typically low-income and minority 
neighborhoods, unemployment rates are higher, and neighborhood 
blight is increasing.
260
 Foreclosed properties pose a significant 
problem as they sit vacant awaiting new residents.
261
 Vacant homes 
affect property values and neighborhood safety and stability, as 
trespassers will often break in and vandalize or otherwise abuse the 
properties.
262
 
Despite signals that the outlook is improving,
263
 estimates suggest 
that the American job market will continue to lag for many years.
264
 
The housing market, too, has been slow to rebound.
265
 Although the 
federal government has tried to stem the foreclosure crisis, mounting 
job losses, particularly in low-income communities, will continue to 
keep the foreclosure rate high.
266
 Further complicating matters, 
Secretary Paulson did not use the first round of bailout funds to 
 
 258. See generally supra Parts I.E & I.F.  
 259. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 3. Disturbingly, but not surprisingly based 
on the history of mortgage financing, foreclosure rates are highest in low-income, minority 
neighborhoods—the very neighborhoods that were, in theory, bolstered by the passage of the 
CRA. See id.  
 260. See id.  
 261. Jonathan Mummolo & Bill Brubaker, As Foreclosed Homes Empty, Crime Arrives, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/ 
26/AR2008042601288.html.  
 262. Id.  
 263. See STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 20.  
 264. See, e.g., Rich Miller & Toby Alder, Diamond, Mortensen, Pissarides Share Nobel 
Prize, BUS. WK. (Oct. 11, 2010, 3:52 PM), http://businessweek.com/news/2010-10-11/diamond 
-mortensen-pissarides-share-nobel-prize.html. Shortly after receiving the Nobel Prize for his 
role in analyzing the job market as a search market, Professor Dale Mortensen wanred that the 
recovery of jobs could take ―a while.‖ Id. For a brief explanation of the search theory proposed 
by Peter Diamond, Dale Mortensen, and Christopher Pissarides, see Edward L. Glaeser, The 
Work Behind the Nobel Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2010, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/10/11/the-work-behind-the-nobel-prize/ (examining the differences between traditional 
economic models and the search theory model as a way to ―make sense of unemployment‖).  
 265. Tony Downs, Overbuilding and High Debt Could Cause Real Estate to Obstruct 
Economic Growth for Years, NAT‘L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR (Oct. 13, 2010, 10:51 AM), 
http://nreionline.com/finance/news/overbuilding_high_debt_1013/index.html.  
 266. See STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 20.  
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purchase troubled assets, to slow the foreclosure crisis, or to address 
housing needs.
267
 Instead the money was used to pump capital into 
the largest banks, to help borrowers secure financing, and to 
encourage more stable banks to purchase troubled banks.
268
 
The taxpayers, in reality, received nothing in return for rescuing 
the struggling financial institutions.
269
 Lenders learned to tighten 
underwriting standards to avoid another crisis, but, in doing so, they 
overreacted and made mortgage financing unavailable not only to 
lower-income families but also to middle-class borrowers.
270
 
Essentially, taxpayer dollars bolstered bank balance sheets and, in 
turn, banks opted not to make new loans of any kind.
271
 
Federal legislation has focused on keeping mortgage financing 
available for housing and preventing foreclosures,
272
 which is 
essential both to homeowners and to renters who find themselves 
facing homelessness when landlords lose rental properties to 
foreclosure. Renters typically have lower incomes than homeowners, 
and they already must deal with an affordable housing shortage and 
the difficulties involved with securing a federal housing subsidy to 
help them dig their way out of excessive housing cost burdens.
273
 
 
 267. See Credit Crisis-Bailout Plan (TARP), supra note 188.  
 268. Id. Nine of the largest banks, including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Bank of America 
and Citigroup, received $25 billion each. Andrew Clark, Elana Schor & Daniel Nasaw, U.S. 
Bites the Bullet with an Aggressive $250bn Bank Bail-Out, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/15/wall-street-bank-shares.  
 269. See generally David D. Kirkpatrick & Charlie Savage, Firms That Got Bailout Money 
Keep Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/business/ 
24lobby.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y; Joe Nocera, First Bailout Formula Had It Right, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/business/24nocera.html?page 
wanted=1&tntemail1=y&emc=tnt; Frank Rich, Op-Ed., Slumdogs Unite!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/opinion/08rich.html?_r=2. 
 270. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 20.  
 271. See Matthias Rieker, Marshall Eckblad & Joe Bel Bruno, Bank Executives to Tell 
Congress: ‘We’re Lending’, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123431547024070839.html; Liz Moyer, Banks Promise Loans but Hoard Cash, FORBES 
(Feb. 3, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/03/banking-federal-reserve-business-
wall-street-0203_loans.html. Representatives of some of the largest financial institutions to 
receive TARP funds appeared before Congress to address the growing public resentment at 
their use of bailout money provided by taxpayers. Rieker, Eckblad & Bruno, supra. 
Maintaining capital, they claimed, was essential to preventing the collapse of their institutions. 
Id.  
 272. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 20. 
 273. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.  
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President Obama signed PTFA to ameliorate the negative impact 
of the foreclosure and economic crises on tenants, Americans with 
typically the least means to survive the crises.
274
 Unfortunately, 
PTFA runs the risk of following in the CRA‘s failed footsteps. 
Despite the protections PTFA supposedly provides, banks still evict 
tenants without adequate notice, often in direct violation of PTFA‘s 
required procedures.
275
 PTFA requires banks to take on traditional 
landlord duties after foreclosing on properties,
276
 but banks rarely are 
willing to do so voluntarily, especially in lower-income 
neighborhoods where rental units may be in a state of serious 
disrepair. Banks prefer to offer tenants disturbingly low cash-for-
keys
277
 settlements rather than having to assume the duties and 
liabilities of being landlords.
278
 
Like the CRA, PTFA lacks enforcement mechanisms. There are 
no statutory penalties for violations nor are there any actual 
mechanisms in place to ensure banks and new owners obey PTFA‘s 
lofty, yet essential, standards. If a bank or owner violates PTFA, the 
only remedy is to dismiss an improperly filed eviction action, 
assuming courts even realize there is a PTFA violation at issue in the 
first place. Although Congress spoke in a clear, unequivocal manner, 
once it finished speaking on the matter it moved on and ignored the 
need to ensure that advocates have the tools to be able to enforce the 
law fully as intended.  
The lack of enforcement mechanisms in PTFA is of particular 
concern for Section 8 tenants, who typically have the lowest incomes. 
 
 274. See supra notes 207–16 and accompanying text.  
 275. See, e.g., Mary E. O‘Leary, State Acts to Protect Renters in Foreclosures, NEW 
HAVEN REG., Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.newhavenregister.com/articles/2010/02/02/news/a3-
netenants.txt. 
 276. See supra notes 207–14 and accompanying text. 
 277. In a cash-for-keys deal, a bank or financial institution that forecloses on an income 
property and becomes a landlord moves to evict any tenants living in the property. Been & 
Glashausser, supra note 50, at 3, 7. In order to settle the eviction suit, many times the bank or 
financial institution will offer tenants a sum of money to voluntarily abandon the property. See 
id. The money is typically intended to cover moving expenses and any related costs necessary 
to find a new home. See id. Sometimes, however, the offers are significantly higher if the new 
owner is particularly motivated to empty the property for resale. 
 278. See Kathryn Lindsay Dobies & Erin Halasz, Renters Face Eviction, Betrayal in 
Landlord Foreclosure, MEDILL REP. (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:54:53 PM), http://news.medill.north 
western.edu/cicago/govt/story.aspx?id=156898&terms=dobies%20renters. 
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Section 8 tenants who find themselves without a home face a more 
difficult task in finding a new home, as they are subjected to strict 
time limits to avoid losing their vouchers.
279
 PTFA seemingly 
addresses this issue by requiring that the banks or new owners accept 
voucher payments; however, in practice, many new landlords ignore 
PTFA‘s requirements and move ahead with evictions immediately 
after purchasing a foreclosed property.
280
  
Time is not the only constraint Section 8 tenants face. Because of 
the stigma attached to federal subsidies and the added paperwork 
involved in arranging a Section 8 lease, landlords are often hesitant to 
rent to Section 8 tenants.
281
 Some states with greater tenant 
protections and some federal affordable housing programs prohibit 
discrimination based on the source of income for rental payments.
282
 
Many, however, do not, making it legal for landlords to refuse to rent 
to Section 8 tenants without any justification. When looked at as a 
 
 279. Tenants are given sixty days to place a voucher. Term of Voucher Rule, 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.303 (2000). Placing a voucher means finding a home to rent with a landlord willing to 
submit to the PHA‘s inspection and paperwork requirements. If a tenant fails to place their 
voucher within sixty days, it is at the PHA‘s discretion whether to allow additional time. Id. If 
subsidy payments are refused by the unit owner, then tenants lose their subsidies and move to 
the bottom of the waiting list if they do not find a new home quickly enough. Id. 
 280. See generally NAT‘L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., 2010 ADVOCATES‘ GUIDE TO 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY 82–84 (2010). 
 281. The Section 8 voucher program does a better job than other federal housing subsidies 
of promoting economic and racial integration and allowing low-income families to live in 
lower-poverty areas. Barbara Sard, How to Promote Integration and Choice Through the 
Section 8 Voucher Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 1 (Sept. 22, 2008), 
http://www.prrac.org/projects/fair_housing_commission/boston/sard.pdf. However, it is less 
successful in urban areas. Id. Sard argues that several reforms are necessary to improve the 
goals of the program, including increasing the time allowed to find a home from sixty days. Id. 
Section 8 tenants face discrimination and are stigmatized based on the ―not in my backyard‖ or 
NIMBY philosophy, causing increased difficulties for placing vouchers beyond just time 
restrictions. Id.  
 282. Only California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin 
have anti-discrimination laws aimed at source of income discrimination. Section 8 Housing, 
NAT‘L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, http://www.prrac.org/pdf/Source_of_Income_Summary.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2010); see also Source of Income Discrimination, NAT‘L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, 
http://nhlp.org/resourcecenter?tid=123 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). In 1996 Paula Beck argued 
that a nationwide source of income discrimination provision needed to be added to the Fair 
Housing Act, but fifteen years later, Section 8 tenants are still without nationwide protection 
from discrimination despite being singled-out as a protected class. See Paula Beck, Fighting 
Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act’s New Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
155, 159 (1996). 
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whole, federal housing policy in its current state fails to benefit 
anyone other than the largest financial actors. 
III. PROPOSAL 
The problem with national housing policy is that it has always 
been reactive rather than proactive. Minority borrowers dealt with 
discrimination for years, until finally the government half-heartedly 
stepped in to end discriminatory lending practices. But with lofty 
goals set and the clamor for reform temporarily quieted, attempts to 
build a better system ended. It is no coincidence that foreclosure 
crises occur shortly before economic crises when housing-related 
costs account for such a large part of the United States‘ GDP.283 In 
order to promote a more stable economy moving forward, a new 
approach to crafting a sustainable housing finance and rental system 
is necessary. 
The government must create a sustainable, comprehensive, 
proactive plan to stabilize the housing industry. A cohesive plan to 
protect the interests of all American families will take into account, 
and reverse, the problems caused by the deregulation of the financial 
services industry, particularly the resulting irresponsible mortgage 
lending programs. Homeowners and tenants alike must be protected 
equally in the hopes of discouraging neighborhood blight and crime 
and strengthening families and communities. Our new vision, moving 
forward, must be one that includes a full commitment to providing 
safe, secure, and affordable homes for all Americans. It must be more 
than a broad, unenforced policy statement from Washington. 
The government must support the creation of responsible lending 
programs for borrowers with lower incomes or unattractive credit 
histories and should incentivize responsible lending in distressed 
communities. Much of what caused the foreclosure and banking 
crises could have been avoided with stringent regulations and 
adequate support for existing lending programs, like the CRA, that 
aim to promote such responsible lending. With so much lending in 
distressed communities taking place outside the scope of the CRA, 
due largely to the rise of new types of financial institutions in the 
 
 283. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 3; STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 6.  
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wake of financial deregulation, the CRA is at risk of becoming 
marginalized even further. As a first step, regulators must develop 
and administer enforcement mechanisms for CRA violations. Further, 
the reach of the CRA must be expanded to take into account the new 
types of financial institutions that are responsible for the large 
amount of lending that occurs in low-income and distressed 
neighborhoods outside of CRA channels.  
Improving the CRA alone, however, is not enough, and new 
legislation will be needed. Rather than creating new legislation to 
broadly state a goal for lending in distressed communities, the 
government needs definite, specific, and enforceable measures in 
place to prevent both redlining and reverse redlining. Solely requiring 
lenders to tighten underwriting standards is not an effective solution 
because many low-income families would be disqualified from 
receiving financing. In fact, even prime borrowers are experiencing 
great difficulties securing financing in the wake of the economic 
crisis.
284
 Low-income neighborhoods cannot move towards 
stabilization if their residents are unable to invest in improving their 
communities. A new federal program to encourage such investment is 
essential, as long as the new program includes sufficient safeguards 
for borrowers and lenders alike. 
Moving forward, stricter standards regulating the most egregious 
predatory lending practices are essential to prevent repeating the 
same mistakes. Low-income borrowers are often unsophisticated 
financial actors. They rely on and trust that lenders would not loan 
them money knowing that they will not be able to repay it, yet that is 
exactly what happens in reverse redlining.
285
 Maintaining the 
 
 284. STATE OF HOUSING 2009, supra note 17, at 2; Bill Briggs, Tighter Standards Slow 
Housing Market, MSNBC (June 23, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37831562/ns/ 
business-real_estate.  
 285. Squires, supra note 24. The CRA is hailed for ending redlining. Essene & Apgar, 
supra note 35, at 1. But in the thirty-four years since its passage, the real threat to low-income, 
minority neighborhoods has come in the form of reverse redlining. Reverse redlining is 
essentially another term for predatory lending. Squires, supra note 24. Borrowers in low-
income, minority neighborhoods are targeted by lenders and offered unfavorable loan terms, 
often even when they could qualify for cheaper, more stable prime mortgages. Id. One study 
estimates that as many as 50 percent of subprime borrowers actually qualify for conventional, 
prime mortgages, mortgages they likely could have afforded to repay had they been given the 
option. Id. These borrowers live almost exclusively in minority neighborhoods. See id.; see also 
Manny Fernandez, Study Finds Disparities in Mortgages by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, 
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American Dream is important, but part of our responsibility as a 
society also includes protecting those who are unable, or unaware of 
the need, to protect themselves. Accordingly, in addition to 
supporting responsible lending, the federal government must promote 
informed borrowing programs and practices—especially among 
lower-income and less creditworthy borrowers. Borrowers bear some 
of the responsibility for irresponsible lending, and they deserve to 
have the tools and information necessary for informed decisions 
readily provided. 
In addition to reshaping the world of mortgage finance through 
new regulations, the federal government needs to commit more fully 
to protecting tenants, particularly those that have the lowest incomes. 
The current affordable rental housing programs are not helping 
enough families to secure safe, suitable homes and should be 
augmented with new, experimental programs aimed at reducing the 
affordable housing shortage. Very low-income tenants eligible for 
Section 8 subsidies have been singled out by the federal government 
as a group in need of special assistance. However, a lack of funding 
combined with the failure to adapt to changing economic conditions 
has eroded the goals of and the protections provided by the Section 8 
program. There is an urgent need for more units that are available to 
very low-income renters at the heavily subsidized rates provided for 
by the Section 8 program, particularly due to the worsening economic 
conditions, but there are few programs in place that can help keep 
units in the private rental market available and affordable for Section 
8 tenants. Additionally, the Great Recession has shown that the 
Section 8 program does not adapt well to changing economic 
conditions. The program should be modified to allow more vouchers 
to be made available, even if only a temporary basis, during 
significant economic downturns to avoid widening the affordability 
gap and increasing homelessness during such periods. 
The decline of affordable rental housing units has plagued the 
United States for many years, but it has only worsened in the wake of 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/nyregion/15subprime.html_r=1&ex=1350187200&en=a9
978e04a9864642&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; STATE OF HOUSING 2010, supra note 45, 
at 19 (high cost lending concentrated in low-income minority neighborhoods); TREASURY 
REPORT, supra note 167, at 47–49, 71–72. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
516 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:473 
 
 
the foreclosure and economic crises.
286
 As units in lower-income 
neighborhoods sit empty, the opportunity to use those vacant units as 
affordable rental housing is squandered. Communities would benefit 
by having families move into vacant properties that are otherwise 
likely to remain vacant for at least the next few years.
287
 There is little 
reason not to incentivize investors and property owners to transform 
vacant properties into affordable and safe private rental housing. 
PTFA can be modified easily to address these types of problems. 
As discussed above, PTFA lacks enforcement mechanisms. Adding 
incentives for new owners, typically banks and purchasers at 
foreclosure sales, to keep units filled with residents rather than 
allowing them to sit vacant is a simple first step. Further, statutory 
damages for PTFA violations, which do not exist now, will create a 
disincentive for banks and new owners to move to evict tenants in 
direct violation of PTFA, as they often do now. Finally, additional 
training information addressing how to identify PTFA violations 
should be made available to law enforcement officials, judicial 
officers, housing advocates, and any other party foreseeably involved 
in eviction actions with potential PTFA claims. This will ensure that 
all parties are apprised of the new law and are better equipped to spot 
violations in time to rectify them and to keep tenants in their homes. 
While implementation of such programs cannot happen overnight, 
there is a smaller change that can be made immediately to drastically 
improve low-income tenants‘ abilities to secure subsidized housing. 
While it is not a new idea,
288
 the need is particularly urgent under 
current economic constraints. Congress must pass a nationwide 
source-of-income anti-discrimination provision to prevent private 
landlords from discriminating against Section 8 tenants just because 
they have a housing choice voucher. Such a provision would help to 
alleviate the pressures Section 8 voucher holders face when trying to 
find a new, affordable unit after they are displaced from their homes 
 
 286. There is a serious affordable housing shortage in the United States. See supra notes 
44–48 and accompanying text (discussing the affordable housing shortage in the United States). 
 287. See Alan Zibel, Freddie Mac To Rent Foreclosed Properties, THE SEATTLE TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/realestate/2008742377_freddiemacrent15. 
html. 
 288. See Beck, supra note 282, at 171. 
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in the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis, even though it is a minor 
change to an otherwise relatively successful program. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The health of all sectors of the housing market, from rentals to 
home purchases, underpins the overall health of the American 
economy. As we sit at a moment in time when there is great change 
in areas like financial regulation and healthcare reform, we have a 
prime opportunity to also reexamine federal housing policy. While 
federal housing policy has always reacted to problems like 
discrimination in mortgage lending or a submerged middle class, a 
definite shift should be made to become more aggressive in our 
policy goals.  
Rather than making a broad statement and abandoning it shortly 
thereafter, as the FHA and CRA did in proclaiming that racial 
discrimination would no longer be tolerated in mortgage financing, 
new housing policy instead must take a proactive approach. It must 
search out potential problems, particularly enforcement problems, 
and make every effort to ensure policy objectives can and will be 
thoroughly implemented before Congress moves on to a new topic 
and forgets the housing sector again. Without a doubt, the health of 
the American economy and our financial future depends on 
developing a new vision for sustainable federal housing policy and on 
following through to meet those new goals.  
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